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FEDERAL SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS REFORM
CHRISTINE GODSIL COOPER*
SHARON BAUER**

On October 13, 1978, President Carter signed into law the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978.1 The Act has been called "one of the most

significant developments in the field of public administration in this
century." 2 It was also the first significant change in the Civil Service
system since the Pendleton Act of 1883. 3 Since the time of the first
Civil Service Act, the total civilian employment in the federal sector
has increased from approximately 131,000 to almost 2.9 million. 4 The
Civil Service Reform Act was, in part, an attempt by President Carter
to fulfill his campaign pledge to reorganize the Civil Service to form a
more efficient government. 5
There are nine titles to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.6 One
of these, title VII (Federal Service Labor-Management Relations) was
* B.A., Rosary College; M.A., University of Illinois; J.D., DePaul University School of
Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School; Assistant Professor, Loyola University Law School.
** B.A., University of Dayton; M.S., Wright State University; J.D., Loyola University Law
School; Labor Relations Specialist, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region V, Chicago, Illinois. The authors thank Nancy Tuohy and Vivian Yamagachi for their research assistance.
1. 92 Stat. 1192, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as the Act or the
CSRA].
2. Frazier, Labor Management Relations in the Federal Government, 30 LAB. L.J. 131, 131
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Frazier]. Mr. Frazier is a member of the Federal Labor Relations
Authority, the body established by title VII to administer the new federal labor relations program.
3. H.R. REP. No. 1043, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2723, 2724. The Pendleton Act established the Civil Service Commission, which was
charged with implementing the merit principle in federal personnel practices. Moreover, Congress was to determine the conditions of employment for federal employees. Civil Service Act of
1883, Act of January 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403. See generally E. HAGBURG & M. LEVINE,
LABOR RELATIONS: AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE, 164-90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HACBURG
& LEVINE].
4. H.R. REP. No. 1043, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2724.
5. President Carter stated that: "I consider civil service reform to be absolutely vital.
Worked out with civil servants themselves, this reorganization will restore the merit principle to a
system that has grown into a bureaucratic maze." President Carter's State of the Union Message,
1978 PUB. PAPERS 90 (January 19, 1978). See ABA Committee Report on Federal Government
Employee Relations, [1978] 61 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 151, 153 [hereinafter referred to as
ABA Report].
6. The nine titles of the CSRA are: I-Merit System Principles; II--Civil Service Functions, Performance Appraisal, Adverse Action; III-Staffing; IV-Senior Executive Service; VMerit Pay; VI-Research, Demonstration, and Other Programs; VII--Federal Service LaborManagement Relations; VIII-Grade and Pay Retention; IX-Miscellaneous.
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enacted in haste with little debate. 7 This title, which became effective
on January 11, 1979, is now the basic law governing federal employee
labor relations. 8 Title VII will have a significant impact on the rights of
federal employees to organize and bargain collectively.
This article will present a survey of the history of federal employee
labor relations, along with an analysis of the most recent developments
embodied in the Civil Service Reform Act. The appendices to this article present a comprehensive view of the legislative history of the reform
bill and provide a convenient comparison of three sources of labor law:
the most recent executive order applicable to the federal sector; its successor, title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978; and the National Labor Relations Act, the most significant body of labor law
covering the private sector. The appendices invite the reader to consider the present state and future development of federal labor relations.
UNIONIZATION IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR

Unionism among government employees began in the 1830's when
the federal skilled craftsmen joined the private sector unions. 9 These
workers found a great deal of resistance from the federal departments
and military heads.' 0 In the following years, benefits secured by federal employees generally resulted from the gains private sector unions
had achieved in industry.I' Unionization in the public sector
progressed slowly; it was not until the 1960's that organized public employees became prominent as a national labor force. 12 By 1968, one
out of every ten union members in the United States was a government
7. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. S 14,266-326 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978); CONG. REC. H 11,820827 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); CONG. REC. S17,084 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978).
8. Frazier, supra note 2, at 131.
9. Project- Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
887, 893 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Collective Bargaining Project]. See also HAGBURG &

LEVINE, supra note 3, at 165. For example, approximately one-fourth of all private sector employees are represented by labor organizations, whereas approximately one-half of all federal employees are so represented. Id, citing Cohany & Dervey, Union Membership Among Government
Employees, 93 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 16 (1970). This union dominance in the federal sector is

particularly striking in view of the unavailability of union security clauses in the federal sector.
See App. 3. However, in 1976 union organizing activity in the federal sector declined somewhat.

ABA Report, supra note 5, at 152-53. See also text accompanying notes 83-86 infra.
10. Collective Bargaining Project,supra note 9, at 2.
11. Id. For example, in 1840 President Van Buren issued an election-eve executive order
"awarding government employees the ten-hour day with no reduction in wages." HAGBURG &
LEVINE, supra note 3, at 165. Federal employees continued to press for pay and benefits comparable to those in the private sector. By 1868, federal laborers and mechanics were the beneficiaries
of "prevailing wage" statutes. Id.
12. See Collective BargainingProject, supra note 9, at 3.
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employee. ' 3 Today, union membership in the public sector has far outpaced that in the private sector. 14
Unionization of federal employees has historically been an unpopular political subject. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William
Howard Taft issued the "gag rule" which deprived government employees of the right to petition Congress on their own behalf.15 By
1912, however, organized federal postal employees had persuaded
Congress to pass the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 16 which guaranteed not
only the right of federal employees to petition, but also their right to
join unions. 17 Shortly thereafter, in 1917, the first union of non-postal8
federal workers was chartered by the American Federation of Labor.'
During the 1930's, Congress supported the right of private sector
employees to organize and bargain collectively. 19 However, public sector unionization was considered a separate issue. Even President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was otherwise friendly to organized labor,
sent a now-famous letter to the National Federation of Federal Employees in 1937:
All government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted
into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very na13. Id.
14. Stieber, Public Employee Unionism.- Structure, Growth, Policy, in 4 LABOR RELATIONS &
SOCIAL PROBLEMS-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 8 (2d ed. 1975).
15. Hart, Collective Bargainingin the Federal Civil Service, in 4 LABOR RELATIONS & SOCIAL
PROBLEMS-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 5 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter re-

ferred to as Hart]. This was by way of executive order:
All officers and employees of the U.S. of every description . . . are hereby forbidden,
either directly or indirectly, individually or through associations, to solicit an increase in
their pay or influence or attempt to influence in their own interests any other legislation
whatever, either before Congress or its committees . . . on penalty of dismissal from the
government service.
Id. at 10.
It has been said that the Coolidge presidency was launched by his well-known opposition to
public employee strikes. When Coolidge was Governor of Massachusetts, he sent a well-publicized telegram to Samuel Gompers, in which Coolidge inveighed against the Boston police strike.
Kennedy & Johnson, Public and Private Employment-A Double Standard, 29 FED. B.J. 11
(1969) [hereinafter referred to as Kennedy & Johnson].
16. See Hart, supra note 15, at 10.
17. HAGBURG & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 166. This act, however, permitted federal employees to join only those unions which did not assert the right to strike against the government. See
generally Hampton, Federal Labor-Management Relations. A Program in Evolution, 21 CATH.
U.L. REV. 493, 494 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Hampton].
18. HAGBURG & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 166. This was the National Federation of Federal
Employees. The relationship between the AFL and the NFEE was short-lived. In 1931, the affiliation with the union was severed because of a dispute over job classifications. The AFL then
chartered another union, the American Federation of Government Employees. Id.
19. See R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 4-5
(1976).
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ture and purposes of government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in
mutual discussions with government employee organizations. The
employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted
by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many
cases restricted, by laws
20 which establish policies, procedures, or rules
in personnel matters.
In 1960, President Eisenhower's attitude was similar, although less restrained:
That public servants might be so unmindful of the national good
as to even entertain thoughts of forcing Congress to bow to their will
would be cause for serious alarm. To have evidence that a number
of them. . . led
2 1by a few, have actually sought to do so is, to say the
least shocking.
Although private sector employees were covered by the National
Labor Relations Act 22 in 1935, federal sector employees were excluded
from its basic protections.2 3 The reluctance to provide collective bargaining rights to the public sector stems from a perception of inherent
differences between private and public employment.
Several theories have been advanced to support the denial of collective bargaining rights to public employees. The sovereignty theory
suggests that the government-employer, as the "ultimate repose of all
legitimate societal power," must not be opposed by the power of labor
unions.24 A second approach is that public employees must sacrifice
their own interests for the public good.2 5 A third concern is that the
division of authority among the many governmental agencies presents
unique problems; for example, how to determine the level and subject
of negotiations. The difficulty of this question is in part due to the
26
various limits on governmental personnel policies levied by Congress.
A fourth consideration is the fear that a public employees' strike would
seriously cripple the economic and social concerns of this country and
20. HAGBURG & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 166.

21. Hart, supra note 15, at 13. President Eisenhower was particularly disturbed that government employee unions were exerting political pressures on Congress. Id. at 12-13.
22. 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). Section 305 of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, 61
Stat. 136, 160 (1947), provided for discharge and forfeiture of civil service status and for striking
federal employees. This section was repealed by Pub. L. No. 330, 69 Stat. 624 (1955), re-enacted
in 5 U.S.C. §§ 118p-118r (1976) which refers to sanctions against government employees.
24. Edwards, Labor Relationsin the Public Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 357, 359 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Edwards].

25. Id. at 360. See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 883-84
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).

26. Edwards, supra note 24, at 361.

LABOR RELATIONS REFORM

even endanger lives. 27 Finally, since the allocation of resources in the
public sector is a political as well as an economic choice, it has been
argued that full collective bargaining in the public sector would give

highly organized groups an unfair advantage in receiving government
funds.28
Although these issues may require special considerations and provisions in a public sector labor relations program, there are fundamental similarities between private and public organizations: their
constituents, the workers, must have some say in the employment policies which govern their lives. The right to decent and just working conditions belongs to all employees, regardless of the character of their
29
employer.
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Viewed against a background of animosity toward public employee collective bargaining, President Kennedy's approach was remarkable. 30 During his presidential campaign, Kennedy asserted his
belief in the right of federal employees to deal collectively with their
employers. 3' In 1962, President Kennedy issued the first Federal Labor
Relations Executive Order, known as Executive Order 10,988,32 which
attempted to assure both the public interest as well as employee
33
rights.
Nonetheless, Executive Order 10,988 assumed fundamental differences between labor relations in the private sector and labor relations
27. See generally Comment, PublicEmployee Legislation: An Emerging Paradox,Impact, and
Opportunity, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 931, 935-38 (1976). The first reported federal strike occurred
in 1835, and was followed by dozens more before the end of the nineteenth century. Hampton,
supra note 17, at 493. In 1969, federal air controllers delayed flights for three hours by their mass
"sick-ins." See Kennedy & Johnson, supra note 15, at 112.
28. Edwards, supra note 24, at 363. Edwards discusses and dismisses, at least in part, the
assumed greater cross-elasticity of demand in the public sector, which is the primary natural limit
to private sector union demands. Id. See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp.
879, 883-84 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971). For a discussion of the issue concerning the
effects of strikes in the public sector as a distortion of the political decision making process, see
Hampton, supra note 17, at 496-97; Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by
Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
29. Edwards, supra note 24, at 364.
30. President Kennedy's position was in large part attributable to the growing political
strength and vigorous efforts of organized labor. See HAGBURG & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 16768.
31. Id. at 168.
32. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1962) (revoked 1969).
33.

U.S. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE

FEDERAL SERVICE 63 (1975) [hereinafter referred to in text and notes as LABOR RELATIONS
COUNCIL].
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in the public sector. The distinctions were thought to require different
degrees of union recognition. Employee organizations in the federal
sector could be recognized in one of three ways: exclusive, formal, or
informal. 34 Each type of recognition conveyed a different degree of
rights. 35 To be accorded exclusive recognition, an employee organization would have to show it had been selected by a majority of employees. 36 Once so recognized, the exclusive representative would be able
to act for and negotiate agreements for covered employees. 37 The governmental agency was required to meet and confer with such organizations at reasonable times on personnel policies and matters affecting
working conditions. 38 If the employee organization could not show a
majority interest but evidenced ten percent employee membership, it
would be afforded formal recognition. 39 This type of recognition required the agency to consult from time to time on the formulation of
personnel policies.4 0 Any organization ineligible for exclusive or formal recognition could still be granted informal recognition. 41 However, an informal organization was permitted only to present its views
on matters of concern to its members.4 2 There was no obligation
placed on the agency to confer or consult on the formulation of person43
nel policies, or to negotiate on any matter.
Executive Order 10,988 authorized negotiations between governmental agencies and exclusive employee organizations." However, in
marked contrast to the private sector, grievance arbitration was to be
advisory in nature, and it could extend only to the interpretation of the
agreement. Moreover, it could be invoked only with the approval of
the aggrieved employee.4 5 Management rights to direct, hire, fire, promote, and suspend employees as well as determine the method and
means to carry out the mission of the agency were maintained. 46 Administration was dispersed: the heads of the executive departments and
34. Exec. Order No. 10,988 §§ 3(a), 4(a), 5(a), 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 861 (1962) (revoked 1969). In
the federal sector, labor organizations were given proportional representation rights, in contrast to
the exclusive rights granted the private sector counterpart.

35. Id. §§ 4(b).
36. Id. § 6(a).
37. Id. § 6(b).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 5(a).
40. Id. § 5(b).
41. Id. § 4(a).
42. Id. § 4(b).
43. Id.
44. Id. §§ 6(b), 7, 8(a).
45. Id. §§ 8(b)(1), (2), (3). See generally Kagel, Grievance Arbitration in the FederalService:
How Final and Binding? 51 ORE. L. REV. 134 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Kagel].
46. Exec. Order No. 10,988 § 7(2), 3 C.F.R. 861 (1962) (revoked 1969).
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agencies, with assistance from the Civil Service Commission, were re-

sponsible for maintaining the program and carrying out the objectives
of the order. 47 Executive Order 10,988 continued unchanged as the labor relations policy for the federal sector for seven years.
A study of Executive Order 10,988 was made by a committee in
1969. The researchers reviewed the status of the executive order program and recommended changes. 48 The committee reported that while
the 1962 order was beneficial to agencies and employees, it failed to

adjust to changing conditions. 49 With the growth of union representation 5 0 significant changes were deemed necessary to continue a constructive labor relations program. 5' The committee recommended, inter
52
alia, the establishment of a central body to administer the program,
expansion of the scope of negotiations, 53 and recourse to a disinterested
54
third party to resolve unfair labor practice complaints.
The committee report and recommendations eventually led to the
issuance of Executive Order 11,49155 signed by President Nixon in
1969. The order established a Federal Labor Relations Council 5 6 consisting of the Secretary of Labor, the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
and other officials of the executive branch as designated by the President.57 The FLRC was to administer and interpret the order, decide
47. Id.

§

12.

48. LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 63.

49. Id.
50. Id. During the seven years of Executive Order 10,988 (1962-69), unionization in the federal sector had grown from twenty-nine exclusive units representing 19,000 employees in the Department of Interior and the TVA to 2,305 exclusive units covering 1,416,073 employees in thirtyfive federal agencies. Fifty-two percent of the total federal workforce subject to the order was
represented by employee organizations which had achieved exclusive representation status. There
were, in addition, approximately 2,000 units which had gained formal or informal recognition.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. There were administrative difficulties in maintaining appropriate distinctions in the
three types of recognition and in dealing fairly with disputes. The committee recommended establishment of a Federal Labor Relations Council consisting of the Secretary of Labor, Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission, an official of the executive office, and other officials as the President
may choose to oversee the program, decide issues, hear appeals, and make recommendations for
program improvement. Id. at 64.
53. Id. at 70. It was recommended that the scope of bargaining be expanded to include
negotiation of arrangements for employees adversely affected by realignment of the workforce or
technological change. Agencies were encouraged to increase their delegations of authority to local
managers to permit a broader scope of negotiations. Id.
54. Id. at 68-69. It was recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations be assigned the responsibility of handling unfair labor practice complaints,
supervising elections, and determining unit and representation disputes. Id. at 69.
55. 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605 (1969).
56. Hereinafter referred to as the FLRC.
57. Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 194 (1969).
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major policy issues, prescribe regulations, and make recommendations
to the President on program improvements.5 8 Executive Order 11,491
provided for exclusive recognition only, to be determined by the vote of
a majority of employees in an appropriate unit.5 9 The order provided
that such a recognized organization had the right to meet with the
agency at reasonable times to confer in good faith with respect to per60
sonnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions.
National consultation rights, similar to those previously granted to formally recognized unions, were to be accorded any organization repre6
senting a substantial number of employees. '
The order devised a system to settle negotiation disputes. Since
federal labor organizations were not allowed to call, engage in, or condone either a strike, work stoppage or slow-down, or to picket an
agency, 62 some procedure was required to resolve an impasse that
would develop during contract negotiations. In the public sector, strike
substitutes have long been considered essential. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, available to the private sector, was required to extend its services to federal agencies. 63 When the FMCS
mediation services failed, the parties could invoke the services of the
Federal Services Impasses Panel,64 which was empowered to settle the
impasse by "appropriate action. ' ' 65 The parties could resort to arbitration or other third party fact finding only upon the authorization of the
FSIP.6 6 Under the order, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor
Management Relations was responsible for deciding appropriate bargaining units, supervising elections, deciding unfair labor practice complaints, and determing questions as to whether a grievance is subject to

58. Id. § 4(b). The FLRC was also given authority to decide appeals on negotiability issues,
exceptions to arbitration awards, and other matters it may deem appropriate. Id. § 4(c).
59. Id. §§ 7(a), 7(0, 10(a). An election was not necessary "where the appropriate unit is
established through the consolidation of existing exclusively recognized units represented by that
organization." Id. § 10(a).
60. Id. § 11.
61. Id. § 9.
62. Id. § 19(b)(4).
63. Id. § 16. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is hereinafter referred to as
FMCS. Section 158 of the National Labor Relations Act requires the party seeking to terminate
or modify the bargaining agreement to give notice to the FMCS within thirty days after initial
notice to the other party. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (1976).
64. Hereinafter referred to as the FSIP.
65. Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 17, 3 C.F.R. 201 (1969). The order established the FSIP as an
agency within the FLRC. It consists of at least three members appointed by the President who are
to consider negotiation impasses, take necessary action to settle impasses, and prescribe administrative regulations. Id. § 5.
66. Id. § 17.
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a negotiated grievance procedure. 67 The Civil Service Commission was
required to provide training and guidance to management officials and
68
review the program operations.
In contrast to the one administrative agency governing private sector labor relations, 69 five organizations were involved in the administration of the federal program: the Federal Labor Relations Council
(FLRC), the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), the
Federal Services Impasses Panel (FSIP), the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management Relations, and the Civil Service Commission.
One year later, in 1970, the FLRC conducted an intensive study as
directed by President Nixon. Their report recommended that the order
be revised. 70 President Nixon signed Executive Orders 11,61671 and
11,63672 as amendments to the original order.7 3 The amendments provided that every negotiated agreement contain a grievance procedure to
cover the interpretation and application of the agreement. 74 In the
past, the inclusion of a grievance procedure was permitted but not required. The amendments further provided that labor and management
could negotiate the use of official time for union contract negotiations. 75 Finally, a provision was made for the withholding of union
76
dues by the agency.
The FLRC again assessed the status of the Federal Labor Relations Program in January, 1975. 77 Their report and recommendations
provided the impetus for Executive Order 11,83878 signed by President
Ford in 1975. This order provided that the coverage and scope of a
grievance procedure would be, for the most part, negotiable between
the parties, and removed the limitation to restrict usage to interpretation of the agreement. 79 The 1975 order also opened up agency regula67. Id§6.
68. Id. § 25.
69. The National Labor Relations Board was established by section 3 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). However, the services of the FMCS are available for negotiation disputes and are mandatory in national emergency disputes. 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1976).
70.

LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 55.

71. 36 Fed. Reg. 17,319 (1971).
72. Id. at 24,901.
73. LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 5.
74. Exec. Order No. 11,491, as amendedby Exec. Order No. 11,616 § 13, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1971).
See 36 Fed. Reg. 17,319 (1971).
75. Exec. Order No. 11,616 § 20, 3 C.F.R. 204 (197 1). However, the amount of official time
was limited to a maximum of forty hours by the executive order.
76. Id.§21.
77. LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 27-52.
78. 40 Fed. Reg. 5,743 (1975).
79. Exec. Order No. 11,616 § 13, 3 C.F.R. 203 (1971). There were still some matters excluded
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tions to the bargaining process under the compelling need doctrine.
Formerly, various levels of governmental agencies would prescribe in80
ternal regulations on personnel policies and working conditions.
These regulations limited negotiations on the issues. Executive Order
11,838 provided that such agency regulations would not bar negotiations on the same topic unless the agency could present a compelling
8
need for adherence to the regulation. '
The Federal Labor Relations Program had evolved through five
Presidents and fifteen years of review and reports. Under Executive
Order 11,491, an exclusive union representative had the right to act for
and negotiate agreements for bargaining unit employees. 82 As in the
private sector, an organization accorded exclusive recognition represented the interests of all employees in the unit without regard to union
membership. 83 In contrast to the private sector, management was not
obligated to meet and confer on all terms and conditions of employment. 84 Items such as positions of employees, tours of duty, or technology of performed work were excluded from federal sector bargaining.
Management in the federal government also retained the right to direct
employees, hire, promote, transfer, suspend, demote, or discharge, and
determine the methods and means to carry out the mission of the
85
agency.
The executive order declared that employees have the right to orfrom grievance coverage. These included matters for which there existed a statutory appeals procedure-removals, discrimination complaints, denial of step increases, unsatisfactory performance
ratings, to name a few. Id.
80. Id. For a discussion of how these regulations limited bargaining and arbitration awards,
see Kagel supra note 45.
81. Exec. Order No. 11,838 § 13, 3A C.F.R. 129 (1975). The final executive order issued in
the Federal Labor Relations Program was Exec. Order No. 12,107, issued by President Carter on
December 28, 1978. 3 C.F.R. 264 (1978).
This executive order was President Carter's implementation of his Reorganization Plan No.
2, 3 C.F.R. 232 (1978). This order aided in the implementation of title VII of the Act, which was
signed in October 1978. The order established the Federal Labor Relations Authority and the
Office General Council (OGC) to administer the program. Exec. Order No. 12,107 §§ 1-4, 3
C.F.R. 323 (1978). The previous FLRC was abolished. The new Federal Labor Relations Authority was to be a three-member panel appointed by the President with concurrence by the Senate. Reorg. Plan No. 2 § 304(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 327 (1978).
82. Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 10(e), 3 C.F.R. 192 (1969).
83. Id. In the private sector, the duty of fair representation is imposed as a duty correlative
to the right of exclusive representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
84. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that a selected representative
shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Compare Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 1 l(b), 3 C.F.R.
198 (1969), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,838 § 1l(b), 3A C.F.R. 126 (1975).
85. Exec. Order No. 11,491 §§ l(a), 11(b), 3 C.F.R. 192, 198 (1969).
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ganize, 86 but not to strike. The retained management rights and the
prohibition against federal employees' use of concerted economic pressure meant that full collective bargaining rights were not available in
the federal sector. Nonetheless, the programs developed under the executive orders had come a long way from the gag rule. Federal em87
ployee rights, although limited, were firmly established.
LABOR RELATIONS REFORM

Unionism had grown considerably under the administration of the
executive orders. In 1963, 180,000 employees were represented by unions holding exclusive recognition rights. 88 The years between 1964
and 1968 revealed annual percentage gains of twenty-seven percent to
forty-five percent. 89 Although the rapid growth of unionism had leveled off by 1976, there were 1.2 million non-postal executive branch
employees represented by unions with exclusive representation rights
in 1978. This represented sixty percent of the executive branch employee population. 90 Exclusive recognition covered eighty-five percent
of general schedule (white collar) employees. 91 Ninety-one percent of
all employees under exclusive recognition were covered by negotiated
agreements. 92 The AFL-CIO Affiliate, American Federation of Government Employees, represents the largest number of unionized employees - 687,965. The independent National Federation of Federal
Employees is second with 138,672 employees represented. 93
With the large number of federal employees unionized, the time
was ripe for labor relations reform. In the past, various members of
Congress had introduced legislation on behalf of federal employee labor groups. 94 These proposals failed. 95 In 1977, there was renewed
congressional attempt to replace Executive Order 11,491 with a labor
86. Id. §§ 1(a), 19(b)(4). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides the same
right with the proviso that the right to refrain from any or all of these activities may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. This
same section allows private sector employees to strike. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
87. See text accompanying note 145 infra.
88.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,

Union Recognitions andAgreements in the FederalGovernment, FED. PERSONNEL MANUAL BULL.

No. 711-77 (1979).
89. Id.

90. This excludes postal employees. Id.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.

93. Id. at 12.
94. Legislation was introduced in the 82d, 84th, and 86th sessions of Congress. 124 CONG.
REC. 14,278 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978).
95. Id.
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relations statute. Federal labor union leadership, both AFL-CIO affiliated and independent, felt that successful congressional action was now
possible with the Democratic Party in control of both executive and
96
legislative branches of the government.
Major criticism of Executive Order 11,491 concerned its inefficient
responses to emergencies and the ill-defined relationship between the
five organizations administering the program. 97 The FLRC, the program's primary administrative body, was composed of part-time, management-oriented officials. 98 The Federal Labor Relations Program,
established by executive order, was unenforeceable in court and subject
to unilateral change or termination by the President.9 9 Therefore, with
growing unionism, increased criticism of the executive order, the President's commitment to reform, and the democratic control of Congress,

conditions were propitious for major reform.
Civil Service Reform
It has been said that were it not for the Civil Service Reform Act,
of which the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute was
one title,1°° there would never have been a labor relations statute.' 0 '
96. See 4B.4 Report, supra note 5, at 153.
97. R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS, & R. CLARK,

LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:

CASES AND MATERIALS 779 (1974).

98. Exec. Order No. 11,491 § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 194 (1975). Robert E. Hampton, former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, believed that the FLRC was intended to be a representative
of the President, not an impartial administrator. See 17 FED. BAR NEWS 70 (1970).
99. See Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronowski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied,382 U.S. 978 (1966). See generally Kennedy & Johnson, supra note 15, at 115-20; Hampton, supra note 17, at 499 n.7. The threat of unilateral action on the part of the President was
"more imagined than real." Frazier, supra note 2, at 133.
The most perceptive criticism of the executive order was levelled by one of its administrators:
The truth is that there is precious little real collective bargaining in the federal sector-and far too much collective begging.
The truth is that the executive orders, while well intentioned, will one day be replaced by legislation.
The truth is that unions have generally chosen to use their resources where they will
do the most good--on Capitol Hill-rather than fritter them away in the frustrating
battle against management rights and the sovereignty of government ...
The reason there is so little true collective bargaining in the federal sector is because
there is so little that can be bargained for.
Congress preempts the economic issues ...
Many of the primary noneconomic issues--seniority, job transfers, discipline, promotion, the agency shop, and the union shop, are nonnegotiable-because of a combination of law, regulation, management rights, and the thousands of pages in the Federal
Personnel Manual.
Address by W. J. Usery, Jr., Special Assistant to the President and Director, Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, to the Collective Bargaining Symposium for Labor Relations Executives, Warrenton, Va., July 8, 1974, printedin 4 LABOR RELATIONS & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 22 (2 ed.

1975).
100. See note 6 supra.
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The impetus for reform had little to do with the federal labor relations
program. Rather, reform of the system was sparked by public opinion
that federal employees were underworked and overpaid. 10 2 Ralph Nader provided reasoned appeal to reform for the public interest:
The reform of our Federal civil service system is a paramount
consumer issue, defined broadly, for millions of people in this country who look to the Federal civil servants to protect them from cancerous additives in food, filth in meat products, defects in cars,
radiation in television sets, flammability in clothes, poisons in air and
water, and monopoly prices in all goods and services ...
People also look to Federal servants to wisely spend 20 or 30
percent of their income which they pay to the Federal Government
in taxes. They look to the civil servants to see that their mail is
promptly delivered, their bank deposits insured, their energy needs
met; in short, effective, efficient, honest, patriotic, committed, hardworking Federal employees are a basic consumer interest in this
country. 103
The reform of the Civil Service structure overshadowed labor relations reform. The chief interests lay in policies concerning hiring,
firing, and paying federal employees. 104 The entire Civil Service Reform Act was passed in just one year. 0 5 Few of the provisions dealing
with labor-management relations were debated by either the House or
the Senate. There is a dearth of legislative history on the specific mean0 6
ing of the labor relations provisions.
101. Frazier, supra note 2, at 133. Frazier also finds the reverse to be true: were it not for the
union support for the labor relations title, there may not have been a Civil Service Reform Act.
102. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978. Hearings on S. 2640, S. 2707 & S. 2830 Before the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (statement of Senator Charles H. Percy), 85 (statement of Alan F. Campbell), 392
(statement of James L. Sundquist), 404 (statement of Ralph Nader) (1978).
103. Id. at 403-04.
104. For the relationship of pay and personnel policies to collective bargaining, see note 99
supra.

105. Rep. J. Hanley, Chairman of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee (DN.Y.) caustically criticized the White House for excessive haste in Civil Service Reform. [1979]
818 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 5.
106. The newly-created FLRA, however, must find specific meaning in order to fulfill its statutory mandate in deciding representation cases, unfair labor practice cases, negotiability disputes,
and arbitration appeals. Frazier, supra note 2, at 132-34. Rep. Frazier stated his views of this
process:
How will the Federal Labor Relations Authority carry out its function of determining that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute means and how it
applies to agencies and unions in the federal sector? The FLRA will establish the meaning of the statute, for the most part, on a case-by-case basis, just as the Federal Labor
Relations Council and the Assistant Secretary have determined the meaning of the Executive Order and as the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts have
established the meaning of the NLRA since its passage over 40 years ago. ...
When a dispute arises between an agency and a union over the meaning and application of the statute, the FLRA will resolve that dispute by interpreting the statute and
the intent of Congress with respect to the particular provision in dispute. To ascertain
congressional intent, the FLRA will attempt to reconstruct the sometimes tortuous path
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PresidentialTask Force Recommendations
As a first step to reform, President Carter requested and received
from Congress the authority to implement changes in the organization
of federal agencies, subject only to congressional veto. 0 7 Under this
authority, the President, in June 1977, established the Federal Personnel Management Project to review the federal civil service and make
recommendations for reform.' 0 8 The project, staffed primarily by federal civil servants, was completed after five months. 0 9 The recommendations of the task force on the federal labor relations system took a
conservative approach to federal labor-management relations; an approach consistent with the priorities and policies embodied in previous
executive orders."10
The task force recommended the establishment of one central
body to administer the program, instead of five administrative bodies."'I It also recommended there be no change in the scope of bargaining and impasse procedures. 1' 2 Although not one of the original four
areas of concern, the group recommended an "agency shop" arrangement, whereby unions and agencies could negotiate representation fees
for employees who were not dues-paying members. 1 3 This provision
was intended to provide union security without requiring employees to
join the union. The unions had contended that because of their obligation to represent all employees fairly, they should be able to collect fees
from non-members."t 4 The task force remained committed to a prowhich the particular provision in dispute took through the legislative process. The decision of the FLRA will not depend on what agencies or unions wish Congress had intended or on what agencies or unions think the law ought to be. The FLRA is interested
in what the law is.
Id. at 132.
107. ABA Report, supra note 5, at 153.
108. Id.
109. H. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2724. The project was divided into nine functional task forces, one of which was to examine ways to improve the federal labor relations system. I PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT,
THE PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION PLAN, FINAL STAFF REPORT [hereinafter referred to as PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT]. Under the management of Professor Chester A. Newland of

the University of Southern California and his senior consultant, Professor Emeritus Frank McCulloch, former chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, the seven-member task force
was asked to examine four areas: central organization for labor relations; organization of the
employer and employee/employer relationships; scope of bargaining; and impasse resolution.
AB,4 Report, supra note 5, at 153. An option paper was published in September 1977 and after
outside comment and reaction, the final recommendations were submitted in December 1977. Id.
110. See ABA Report, supra note 5, at 153.
111. Id. The five bodies included the FLRC, the FMCS, the FSIP, the Secretary of Labor for
Labor-Management Relations, and the Civil Service Commission.
112. See generally PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT supra note 109.
113. Id. at 176-77.
114. 1978 Cong. Q. Almanac 831-32.
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gram of relying on executive orders and did not propose legislation.

15

Clay-FordBills.: Independent CongressionalAttempts
At the same time that the reorganization task force was assessing
the federal labor relations program, Congress was actively considering
two major pieces of federal employee collective bargaining legislation.
In March 1977, the Subcommittee on Civil Service, House Committee
on Post Office and Civil Service was reviewing H.R. 13, sponsored by
Representative William Clay (D-Missouri) and H.R. 1589, sponsored
by Representative William D. Ford (D-Michigan). 16 Both bills represented a significant departure from the policies embodied in the previous executive order. Representative Clay commented "[tihe Federal
labor-management relations program is overly management-oriented
and places management at an unfair advantage over employees. The
program, because it is authorized by Executive Order, is too susceptible
to the whims of an incumbent President. The program is too limited in
its scope."'17

Both bills greatly expanded the scope of bargaining compared to
Executive Order 11,491. The bills dealt with such matters as pay practices, work hours, promotion and overtime procedures, seniority, discipline, and detail and leave practices." 8 The bills also provided for an
"agency shop," wherein the parties could negotiate payment of representation fees as a condition of employment. 1 9 H.R. 1589 even legalized strikes by federal employees. 120 Action on both bills was halted in
June of 1977 at the request of the Carter administration, which was
promoting its own task force study group.' 2 1 Interest in the expansive
bills was renewed in August 1977 when the House Subcommittee on
Civil Service combined both H.R. 13 and H.R. 1589 to form H.R.
9094,122 known as the Clay-Ford bill. However, subsequent to the subcommittee hearings, no further action was taken on the Clay-Ford bill.
115. AB4 Report, supra note 5, at 155. Note that as a political question consideration of this
matter was beyond the scope of the project.
116. Id. at 151.
117. Improved Labor-ManagementRelations in the Federal Service.- Hearings on H. 13 &
HR. 1589 Before the House Subcomm. on Civil Service of the Comm. on Post Office and Civil
Service, 95th Cong., ist Sess., 2 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings].
118. ABA Report, supra note 5, at 152.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Hearings,supra note 117, at 1. The Subcommittee on Civil Service, House Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service has primary responsibility for civil service bills. AB4 Report, supra
note 5, at 151.
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President Carter'sLegislation
On March 2, 1978, President Carter transmitted to Congress his
message on civil service reform, and included his draft of legislation.
He explained his purpose in revising labor-management relations:
The goal . . . will be to make Executive Branch labor relations
more comparable to those of private business, while recognizing the
special requirements of the Federal government and the paramount
public interest in the effective conduct of the public business.
It [the legislation] will permit the establishment through collective bargaining of grievance and arbitration systems, the cost of
which will be born largely by the parties to the dispute. Such procedures will largely displace the multiple appeals systems which now
perceived as too costly, too cumberexist and which are unanimously
23
some, and ineffective.1
Two months later, on May 10, 1978, the President's proposed labor relations bill was submitted to both the House and Senate. 24 In submitting his plan, the President explained the defects of the existing order:
The Civil Service Commission has acquired inherently conflicting responsibilities: to help manage the Federal Government and to
protect the rights of Federal employees. It has done neither job well
An Executive Order now vests existing labor-management relations in a part-time Federal Labor Relations Council, comprised of
three top government managers. . . . This arrangement is defective
because the Council members are part-time, they come exclusively
from the2 5 ranks of management and their jurisdiction is fragmented. 1
President Carter's proposed plan centralized administration in the Federal Labor Relations Authority, consisting of three full-time presidential appointees, along with a general counsel to handle unfair labor
26
practice charges.'
Title VII, as proposed, did not provide for negotiation of pay practices, work hours, or seniority. However, it did increase the topics subject to negotiation over those negotiable under the executive order.
The new legislation included such topics as grievance and arbitration
123. 36 Cong. Q. Weekly 658-61 (1978).
124. CipilService Reform Act of1978: Hearings on S. 2640 Before the Senate Comm. on Go PermentalAffairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 84 (1978). The original bil did not contain a section on
labor-management relations. The President later proposed an amendment dealing with this subject. The amendment was to be incorporated as title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act and
entitled Labor-Management Relations. Id.
125. President Carter's May 23, 1978 Message to Congress Accompanying His Plan on Reorganization of the Civil Service Commission, 36 Cong. Q. Weekly 1353 (May 27, 1978). Note that
when President Carter was speaking of the existing executive order, he was referring to Exec.
Order No. 12,107, 44 Fed. Reg. 1,055 (1978). See also note 81 and accompanying text supra.
126. Id.
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procedures, paid time for employee-union representation, work scheduling, assignment of overtime, health and safety programs, union dues
withholding, equal employment opportunity policy, and discipline policy. 127

The House did not approve the President's proposal. On July 10,
1978, after hearings and consideration of amendments,' 28 the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, by a vote of eighteen to seven,
substituted an entirely new text for the administration's bill. 29
The committee believed that the labor-management relations portion of the President's bill was essentially a codification of existing executive orders.1 30 The committee agreed that a statutory labormanagement relations system for federal employees must be estab3
lished, but it disagreed with the President's specific proposals.' ' It
wanted the labor relations program to be expanded. Mindful of the
fate of H.R. 9094, the committee recommended the establishment of a
broad new program providing that the employees through their unions
"be permitted to bargain with agency management throughout the executive branch on most issues, except that Federal pay will continue to
be set in accordance with the pay provisions of title 5,132 and fringe
benefits, including retirement, insurance, and leave will continue to be
13 3
set by Congress."'
The civil service reform legislation came before both the House
and Senate between July and September 1978. A broad based support
for the House version of civil service reform developed in response to
the urgings of the American Federation of Government Employees and
34
independent unions.
On August 24, 1978, by a vote of eighty-seven to one, the Senate
passed its version of the Civil Service reform legislation, S.2640.135
127. Id.
128. Id. The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service conducted thirteen days of
hearings on H.R. 11,280 from March to May 1978. Testimony was given by 203 witnesses representing the federal government, business, and other interest groups. At the conclusion of the hearings, the committee met for ten days during June and July of 1978 to revise H.R. 11,280. Seventyseven separate amendments were considered. Id.
129. See House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, Report on Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, H.R. REPORT No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5385 (1976).
133. Id. The committee felt that their amended version of title VII of H.R. 11,280 "strikes a
proper balance between the public interest and the demands of citizens who are employees of the
Federal Government who wish to have a greater voice in the employment policies applicable to
them." Id.
134. [1978] 770 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 4.
135. [19781 774 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 8.
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The Senate version more closely resembled the President's original proposal. The Senate version amended the administration's title VII, labor
management provision, in several ways. The Senate version required:
secret ballot elections prior to the imposition of a bargaining obligation
on any agency; decertification of any exclusive representative who fails
to take action to prevent a strike or slowdown; that employees hear
both sides of the representation question during election campaigns, as
long as there are no threats of reprisal of coercive conditions; and,
finally, it provided judicial review of FLRA Unfair Labor Practice de36
cisions.'

Since the House and Senate versions were incompatible, 37 the
measure then moved to the House-Senate Conference Committee.
There, most of the House provisions were agreed to, thus expanding the
rights of federal employees beyond those contemplated by the executive order. 38 Specifically, the conference committee gave federal employee unions more latitude in negotiations than the Senate had
provided. The conference report was presented to the Senate on October 4, 1978, and approved by voice vote. 39 The report was filed with
the House and on October 6, by a vote of 365 to 8, the House agreed to
the report. 40 Finally, on October 13, 1978, President Carter signed
into law the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.1' 4 The law became effective January 11, 1979.142
FEDERAL SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS:
TOWARD THE PRIVATE SECTOR MODEL?

The full impact of federal labor-relations reform will not be revealed until the new law has been defined by its application over
time. 43 The consensus of those involved in the reorganization of the
federal program is that federal employees deserve the rights granted to
private sector employees with only those limitations required by the
public interest. 144 However, there is no clear articulation of the content
or resolution of these conflicting goals. A comparison of title VII to its
136. 124 CONG. REC. 14,311 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978).
137. A comparison of the House and Senate versions of the legislation is set out in App. 2.
138. 36 Cong. Q. Almanac 835 (1978). The conference report became known as No. 95-1272
accompanying S. 2640. See [1978] 781 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 27.
139. [1978] 780 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 6.
140. [1978] 781 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 7.
141. 92 Stat. 1192, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1978).
142. [1978] 781 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 7.
143. See Apps. 2 and 3.
144. See, e.g., text accompanying note 123 supra.
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predecessor, Executive Order 11,491, as amended, as well as to its private sector counterpart, may indicate the current balance between fed45
eral employee rights and the public interest. 1
In many significant ways, federal labor relations remains the same
as it was under the executive order programs. Management retains the
right, both directly and indirectly, through Congress to set rates of pay
and to hire and fire. Labor organizations in the federal sector are denied union security rights notwithstanding the expanded duties of the
federal union in bargaining and processing grievances. As the legislative history makes clear, the new Act is not to be interpreted as allowing negotiation of an agency shop or a union shop. Federal
employees cannot strike. The reform legislation requires federal employees to cooperate in impasse resolution, and each contract must provide for binding arbitration as the final step in the grievance procedure.
These provisions emphasize that strikes in the public sector will not be
tolerated. But more important, the conservative aspects of the new legislation reflect a public concerned with the fact that the awesome power
of unions will be abused in the federal government, all to the detriment
of the public interest.
Yet, federal labor relations has moved toward the private sector
model. The new program is administered by an impartial Federal Labor Relations Authority. This is a dramatic break from the past, when
administration was vested in the FLRC which, as constituted, was
management-oriented. Not only is there now impartial administration
of the rights and duties contained in the Act, but complaints of unfair
labor practices in the federal sector are now investigated and prosecuted by a general counsel; just as it is done in the private sector.
Under the old program, the complainant had the burden of prosecuting
the unfair practice charge. 46 Since the prosecution function has been
vested in the general counsel within the Federal Labor Relations Authority, there is statutory recognition of the fact that the rights declared
in title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act constitute national policy.
It has long been recognized in the private sphere that declared em145. The conclusions reached in this section are supported at App. 3.
146. According to Ronald W. Haughton, the prior program's burden on individual complainants is evidenced by the fact that only fifteen percent of the unfair labor practice charges were filed
by individuals, with the remainder filed by labor organizations; whereas in the private sector, up
to fifty percent of the charges are filed by individuals. Remarks of Ronald W. Haughton, Chairman, Federal Labor Relations Authority, distributed before the Labor and Employment Law
Committee, Chicago Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, November 14, 1979 [hereinafter referred
to as Remarks of Chairman Haughton].
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ployee rights are not merely personal rights, but are important public
rights as well.
The declaration of employee rights and what constitutes an unfair
labor practice in the federal sector mirrors the private sector provisions.
However, because of the abhorrence of strikes by the public in the public sector, there are the provisions for strike substitutes, and it is an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization representing federal employees to refuse to cooperate in impasse procedures or to participate in
or condone a strike.
Most important in the reform act is that employee rights are now
enforceable in court, since the rights are based on statute rather than
executive order. 14 7 The FLRA may seek enforcement of its orders in
the United States courts of appeals, and any person aggrieved by any
final order of the FLRA may likewise seek judicial review. Comparable provisions govern the private sector. Arbitration awards are to be
granted a finality similar to that obtained in the private sphere; legislative history makes clear that judicial review of arbitration awards is to
be modeled on the narrow scope of review available in the private sec48

tor. 1

Because federal employees can negotiate more topics than were
hitherto allowed, the role of the grievance procedure is thereby increased: the more topics included in a contract, the more items requiring interpretation and compliance. Union officials are granted official
time for negotiations and dues checkoffs are authorized. Together
these provisions expand the duties of the federal union while allowing
for only limited union security.
The new Act has firmly established the Weingarten14 9 concept for
federal service employees: a union has the right to be present at any
147. See App. 3. See also Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronowski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). Back pay and attorneys fees are available under 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1976) to victims of
unjustified personnel actions. Although back pay is a common remedy in private sector unfair
labor practice cases, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), the award of attorney's fees is rare. See, e.g.,
Heck's Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 142 (1974). The new provision in the Civil Service Reform Act, which
is not a part of but refers to the labor relations title, applies to both unfair labor practice cases and
grievances. Again, back pay is a common private sector arbitration remedy, while the award of
attorney's fees is not. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (3d
ed. 1973).
148. Chairman Haughton noted that the federal statute may require arbitrators to defer to
applicable laws and regulations; arbitrators in the private sector, however, may rule that the internal law of the contract takes precedence over any external law. Remarks of Chairman Haughton
supra note 146.
149. NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975), established the right, upon employee's request, to have a union representative present at an investigatory interview which could result in
disciplinary action.
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investigatory interview if the employee reasonably believes the examination may result in discipline and requests such representation. However, the legislative history is explicit that private sector
implementation of Weingarten rights is not to be controlling in federal
sector implementation of those rights. 50
Although it is premature to assess the impact of the federal labor-

relations reform legislation, it does appear that employee rights have
been expanded under the reform act, and at no apparent expense to the
public. Further developments under the Act will be eagerly analyzed
by scholars, practitioners, bureaucrats, and public employees.

150. Section 7114(a)(2)(B) provides that:
[An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an agency shall be given the opportunity to be represented at any examination of an employee in the unit by a representative of the agency in connection with an investigation if-(i) the employee reasonably
believes that the examination my result in disciplinary action against the employee; and
(ii) the employee requests representation.
5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1978). The plain language of this section suggests that the representation right is conferred upon a union as an organizational entity. It has yet to be determined if
such right also extends to individual unit employees.
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APPENDIX I

SEQ UENCE OFEVENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Exec. Order No. 10,988 (Kennedy)
Exec. Order No. 11,491 (Nixon)
Exec. Order No. 11,616 (Nixon)
Exec. Order No. 11,636 (Nixon)
Exec. Order No. 11,901 (Ford)
H.R. 13 and H.R. 1589 introduced
House Committee consideration (ultimately
halted at the request of the Administration)
Federal Personnel Management Project established (Carter's review of the Civil Service
System)
H.R. 9094 considered (combining H.R. 13 and
H.R. 1589)
Final Report - Task Force, Federal Personnel
Management Project
President transmits CSC reform legislation to
Congress - no labor relations provisions
Title VII - Labor Relations Bill added to
reform legislation
Committee on Governmental Affairs of the
Senate hearings on S. 2640
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service of
the House hearings on H.R. 11280
Committee on Governmental Affairs approved
S. 2640, vote 11 - 2 (Report 95-696)
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
approved H.R. 11280, vote 18 - 7 (Report 951403)
Senate approves S. 2640, vote 87 - 1
House approves H.R. 11280, vote 385 - 10
House-Senate Conference Report (Report 951272) reported to and approved by Senate
(voice vote)
House-Senate Conference Report (Report 951272) reported to and approved by House, vote
365 - 8

20. President Carter signs S. 2640, Pub. L. No. 95454
21. Exec. Order No. 12,107 (Carter)
22. Effective date of Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat.
1192, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-35 (1978)

January 17, 1962
October 29, 1969
August 26, 1971
December 17, 1971
January 30, 1976
March 1977
June 1977
June 1977
August 1977
December 1977
March 2, 1978
May 10, 1978
April 6-May 19, 1978
March-May 1978
June 29, 1978
July 19, 1978
August 24, 1978
September 11, 1978
October 4, 1978
October 6, 1978
October 13, 1978
December 28, 1978
January 11, 1979
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APPENDIX 2
COMPARISON OF SELECTED PRO VISIONS OF HO USE
BILL, SENATE BILL, AND COMPROMISEBILL
House Bill I

Senate Bill 2

Compromise Bill

3

FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
States that statutory protection of an employee's right to
organize, bargain collectively
and participate in decisions
which affect them through labor organizations of their
choosing is in the public interest because "such protection
facilitates and encourages the
amicable settlement of disputes between employees and
their employers involving
conditions of employment"
and because such protection
"contributes to the effective
conduct of public business."
§ 7101(a).

States that the "public interest demands the highest
standards of employee performance and the continued
development and implementation of modern and progressive work practices to facilitate and improve employee
performance and the efficient
accomplishment of the operations of the Government."
§ 7201(a).

Combines the findings and
purpose of both the Senate
and the House. § 7101(a).

States that the purpose of
the chapter is to "prescribe
certain rights and obligations
of the employees of the Federal Government and to establish procedures which are
designed to meet the special
requirements and needs of the
Federal Government."
§ 7101(b).

States that the statutory
protection of the rights of employees "to organize, bargain
collectively within prescribed
limits, and to participate
through labor organizations
of their own choosing in decisions which affect them (1)
may be accomplished with
full regard for the public interest (2) contributes to the effective conduct of public business and (3) facilitates and encourages the amicable settlement between employees and
their employers of disputes involving personnel policies and
practices and matters affecting
working conditions."
§ 7201(b).

Adds that the provisions of
the chapter "should be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the requirement of an effective and efficient government." § 7101(b).

1.
2.
3.
referred

H.R. 11,280, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
S. 2640, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
H. & S. CONFERENCE REP. No. 1272, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter sometimes
to in this chart as CR].
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FINDINGS AND PURPOSE, con't
House Bill

Senate Bill

Compromise Bill

States the same purpose as
the House Bill § 7101(b) except that the rights and obligations of federal employees
prescribed by the chapter are
subject to the "paramount interest of the public."
§ 7201(c).
EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS
Provides that "each employee shall have the right to
form, join, or assist any labor
organization, or to refrain
from any such activity, freely
and without fear of penalty or
reprisal," and that each employee shall be "protected in
the exercise of such right."
§ 7102.

Provides in addition that
"no employee shall be required by an agreement to become or to remain a member
of a labor organization, or to
pay money to an organization."

Adopts
House
Bill
§ 7102(1) and (2). Conferees
emphasize, however, that
nothing in the conference report authorizes, or is intended
to authorize the negotiation of
an agency shop or union shop
provision.

Does not define "dues,"
"collective bargaining agreement," "conditions of employment,"
"firefighter" or
"United States" but otherwise
provides generally the same
definitions as the House Bill
with the following additional
definitions: "agency management," "General Counsel,"
and "Assistant Secretary."
§ 7202(a).

Adopts House Bill.
§ 7103(a).

DEFINITIONS; APPLICATION
Defines "person," "employee," "agency," "labor organization," "dues," "authority," "panel," "collective bargaining agreement," "grievance,"
"supervisor,"
"management official," "collective bargaining," "confidential employee," "conditions of employment," "professional emloyee," "exclusive
representative,"
"firefighter," and "United
States." § 7103(a).

Provides the President with
the power to issue an order
excluding any agency or subdivision thereof from coverage under this chapter under
certain circumstances.
§ 7103(b).

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY (FLRA)
States that the FLRA is
comprised of three (3) members, not more than two (2) of
whom may be adherents of
same political
party. No
members shall engage in any
other business or employment
or hold another office or position in the Government of the
United States except as otherwise provided by law.
§ 7104(a).

Same provision as House.
§ 7203(b).

Adopts House Bill. § 7104.

LABOR RELATIONS REFORM
House Bill

Senate Bill

Compromise Bill

Members of the authority
to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and may be
removed by the President
only upon notice and hearing
and only for misconduct, inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office. The
President shall designate one
member to serve as chairman
of the authority. § 7104(b).

Members of the authority
to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate and
shall be eligible for reappointment. The President shall
designate one member to
serve as Chairman of the authority. Any member of the
authority may be removed by
the President. § 7203(c).

Adopts
§ 7104(b).

Provides that one of the
original members of the authority shall be appointed for
a term of one (1) year, one for
a term of three (3) years, and
the Chairman for a term of
Thereafter,
five (5) years.
each member shall be appointed for a term of five
years. § 7104(c)(1).
Notwithstanding the above
paragraph, the term of any
member shall not expire
before the earlier of(1) the date on which the
member's successor takes
office, or

Provides that the term of
office of each member of the
authority is five (5) years, except that a member may continue to serve beyond the expiration of the term to which
appointed until earlier of(I) the date on which the
member's successor has
been appointed and has
qualified, or
(2) the last day of the session of Congress beginning after the date the
member's term of office
(but for this sentence) expire. § 7203(d)(1)(2).

House
Adopts
§ 7104(c)(1)(2).

House

Bill.

(2) the last day of Congress
beginning after the date
on which the member's
term of office would (but
for this subparagraph)
expire. § 7104(c)(2).
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE AUTHORITY
Authorizes the Authority to
delegate to any regional director, its authority to determine
whether a group of employees
is the appropriate unit; to conduct investigations and to
provide for hearings; to determine whether a question of
representation exists and to
direct an election; and to conduct secret ballot elections
and certify secret ballot elections and certify the results
thereof. § 7105(3)(1).

Authorizes the Authority to
delegate to officers and employees the authority necessary to perform its duties.
§ 7204(f).

Adopts House
§ 7105(3)(1).

language.

534

CHICAGO-KENT L4W REVIEW

House Bill

Senate Bill

Compromise Bill

Authorizes the Authority to
delegate to any administrative
law judge, appointed by the
Authority, its power to determine whether any person engage or is engaging in an unfair labor practice.
§ 7105(e)(2).

The Authority may consider, in accordance with regulations prescribed by it, any:
I) appeal from a decision regarding the negotiability of a
proposal; 2) exception to any
arbitration award; 3) appeal
from any decision of the assistant secretary regarding standards of conduct for labor organizations; 4) exception to
any final decision and order
of the Federal Service Impasses Panel; and 5) other
matters it deems appropriate
in order to assure it carries out
the purposes of this chapter.
§ 7204(c).

Adopts House
§ 7105(f)(1)(2).

Authorizes the Authority to
review any action taken by a
regional director or administrative law judge, who has
delegated by the Authority to
take such action, upon application by any interested person, filed within 60 days after
the date of the action. The review, however, shall not, unless specifically ordered by the
Authority, operate as a stay of
the action. The Authority
may affirm, modify, or reverse
any action reviewed under
this subsection. If the Authority does not undertake to
grant review of the action
within 60 days after the later
of: 1) the date of the action;
or 2) the date of the filing of
any application for review of
the action, the action shall become the action of the Authority at the end of such 60day period. § 7105(f)(1)(2).

States that if a regulation or
other policy directive issued
by the Office of Personnel
Management is at issue in an
appeal before the Authority,
the Authority shall timely notify the Director, and the Director shall have standing to
intervene in the proceeding
and shall have all the rights of
a party to the proceeding.
§ 7204(h)(2).

Adopts House language.
§ 7105(f)(1)(2).

Authorizes the Director to
request that the Authority reopen an appeal and reconsider its decision on the
ground that the decision was
based on an erroneous interpretation of law or of a controlling regulation or other
policy directive issued by the
Office of Personnel
Management.
§ 7204(h)(3).

language.

LABOR RELA TIONS REFORM
House Bill

Senate Bill

Compromise Bill

"Unfair labor practice decisions are appealable as in the
Senate. In addition, all other
final decisions of the Authority involving an award by an
arbitrator and the appropriateness of the unit an organization seeks to represent are
also appealable to the courts."
§ 7123(a).

Makes reviewable in court
decisions of the Authority
concerning unfair labor practices, including awards of arbitrators relating to unfair laboi practices.
Otherwise,
the Senate bill provides that
all decisions of the Authority
are final and conclusive, and
not subject to further judicial
review except for questions
arising under the Constitution.
§§ 7204(1), 7216(0,
7221(j).

"In the case of arbitrators
awards involving adverse actions, the conferees elected to
adopt the approach in the
Senate bill. The decision of
the arbitrator in such matters
will be appealable directly to
the court of appeals (or court
of claims) in the same manner
as a decision by MSPB."

"In the case of those other
matters that are appealable to
the Authority the conference
report authorizes both the
agency and the employee to
appeal the final decision of
the Authority except in two
instances where the House recedes to the Senate. As in the
private sector, there will be no
judicial review of the Authority's determination of the appropriateness of bargaining
units, and there will be no judicial review of the Authority's action on those arbitration awards in grievance cases
which are appealable to the
Authority. The Authority will
only be authorized to review
the award of the arbitrator on
very narrow grounds similar
to the scope of judicial review
of an arbitrator's award in the
private sector." In light of the
limited nature of the Authority's review, the conferees determined it would be inappropriate for there to be subsequent review by the court of
appeals in such matters.
§ 7123(a).
No comparable provision.

Authorizes Authority to request from the Director of the
Office of Personnel Management an advisory opinion
concerning the proper interpretation of regulations or
other policy
directives
promulgated by the Office of
Personnel Management in
connection with a matter
before the Authority for adjudication. § 7204(h)(I).

Adopts Senate language.
§ 7105(i).
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House Bill

Senate Bill

Compromise Bill

No comparable provision.

Provides that all expenses
of the Authority (including all
necessary travel and subsistence expenses outside the
District of Columbia) incurred by members, employees or agents of the Authority,
will be allowed and paid on
the presentation of itemized
vouchers therefor approved
by the Authority. § 7204(g).

No comparable provision.

No comparable provision.

No comparable provision.

Authorizes Authority to
prescribe criteria and resolve
issues relating to determining
compelling need for agency
rules or regulations. Also authorizes Authority to resolve
issues relating to the duty to
bargain in good faith, to resolve exceptions to arbitrator's
awards, and to take such other
actions as are necessary and
appropriate to effectively administer the provisions of this
chapter. § 7105(a)(2).

AREAS EXCLUDED FROM NEGOTIATIONS
Permits, but does not require, the agency to negotiate
on the methods and means by
which agency operations are
to be conducted. § 7106(b)(1).

"Prohibits negotiations on
the methods and means by
which agency operations are
to be conducted."
§ 7218(a)(2)(E).

Prohibits negotiations on
the issue of the number of employees in an agency under
any circumstance.
§ 7106(a)(l).

Permits the agency in its
discretion to negotiate on the
"number of employees in an
agency." § 7215(d).

Requires the agency to retain the right to make determinations with respect to contracting out work.
§ 7106(a)(2)(B).

No comparable wording.

Senate recedes. Conferees
emphasize, however, that
nothing in the bill is intended
to require an agency to negotiate on the methods and
means by which agency operations are to be conducted.
Conference report fully
preserves the right of management to refuse to bargain on
"methods and means" and to
terminate bargaining at any
point on such matters even if
it initially agrees to negotiations.
Senate recedes.
Conference adopts House
provision. § 7106(a)(1).

Senate recedes.
Conference adopts House
provision. § 7106(a)(2)(B).

LABOR RELATIONS REFORM
House Bill
No comparable wording.

Permits any agency and any
labor organization to negotiate 1) procedures which management officials of the
agency will observe in exercising their authority to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and internal security
of the agency and 2) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the
exercise of the authority.
§ 7106(b)( I)(2).

Senate Bill
Requires the agency to retain the rights to "maintain
the efficiency of the Government operations entrusted to
such officials."
§ 7218(a)(2)(D).

No comparable provision.

Compromise Bill
Senate recedes.
Conferees do not intend
thereby to suggest that agencies may not continue to exercise their lawful prerogatives
concerning the efficiency of
the Government.
Adopts House
§ 7106(b)(2)(3).

language.

RECOGNITION OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Provides that any person alleging that 30% of the employees in an appropriate unit
wish to be represented for the
purpose of collective bargaining by an exclusive representative (if there is not an exclusive representative already) or
that 30% of the employees in
the unit allege that an exclusive representative is no
longer the representative of
the majority of the employees
in the unit, may file a petition
with the Authority to investigate and decide whether a
question of representation exists. § 7111(b)(A).

Provides that the Authority
can decide questions submitted to it with respect to the appropriate unit for purposes of
exclusive recognition and with
respect to any related issue.
§§ 7204(b)(1); 7214(b).
Authorizes elections to be
held to determine whether to
recognize or replace an exclusive representative. § 7214(c).

Adopts House provision.
§ 7111 (b)(1).

Provides that if after 45-day
period (which begins to run
on the date the petition was
filed) issues concerning the
appropriateness of the unit,
the eligibility of an employee
to vote, etc., remain unresolved, the Authority can
direct election by secret ballot.
§ 7111(2)(A).

No comparable provision.

No comparable provision.
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House Bill

Senate Bill

Compromise Bill
Adopts House provision.

Provides that a labor organization under certain circumstances may intervene with respect to a petition filed for
representation by another organization and may be placed
on the ballot with respect to
organization which filed petition. § 7111 (c).

No comparable provision.

Authorizes runoff election
between two choices receiving
highest number of votes if no
choice on the ballot receives
majority of votes cast.
§ 7111 (d)(2).

No comparable provision.

Adopts House provision.
§ 7111 (d)(2).

Provides that a labor organization may be certified as an
exclusive representative only
after it is determined that majority status was achieved
without any unfair labor practices and that no other question of representation exists.
§ 711 l(e).

No comparable provision.

No comparable provision.

Specifies circumstances
under which exclusive recognition will not be granted.
§ 711 l(n).

Similar
circumstances
stated. § 7217(a).

Adopts House language.
§ 711 l(f).

Requires labor organization
seeking exclusive recognition
to submit to Authority and
agency involved a roster of its
officers and representatives, a
copy of its constitution and
bylaws, and a statement of its
objectives. § 7111(g).

No comparable provision.

States that nothing in
is to be construed as
prohibiting the waiving of
hearings by stipulation for the
purpose of a consent election.
§ 711 l(i).

§ 7111

§ 7111(c).

Adopts House

language.

§ 7111(3).

Adopts House
§ 7111(g).

language.

LABOR RELATIONS REFORM
House Bill

Senate Bill

Compromise Bill

REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND DUTIES
Gives a labor organization
that "has been certified as the
exclusive representative the
right to be present at the employee's request at any investigatory interview of an employee by an agency if the employee reasonably believes
that the interview may result
in disciplinary action against
the employee." In addition,
the House bill requires the
agency to inform the employee of his right of representation at any investigatory
interview of an employee concerning 'misconduct' which
"could reasonably lead to suspension, reduction in grade or
pay, or removal."
§ 7114(a)(2)(3).

No comparable provision.

Adopts House provision
with an amendment deleting
the House provision requiring
the agency to inform employees before certain investigatory interviews of the right to
representation, and substituting a requirement that each
agency inform its employees
annually of the right to representation. The conferees further amended the provision so
as to give the labor representative the right to be present
at any examination of an employee by a representative of
the agency in connection with
an investigation if the employee reasonably believes
that the examination may result in disciplinary action
against the employee. The
conferees recognized that the
right to representation in examinations may evolve differently in the private and Federal sectors, and specifically
intended that future court decision interpreting the right in
the private sector will not necessarily be determinative for
the Federal sector.

WITHHOLDING OF DUES
Authorizes an agency to deduct dues from the pay of
members of a labor organization whenever an employee in
the appropriate unit gives the
agency a written assignment
authorizing the deduction.
The House also specifies that
the allotment shall be made at
no cost to the exclusively recognized labor organization or
the employee. § 7115(d).

Prohibits an agreement
from requiring an employee
to become or to remain a
member of a labor organization or to pay money to the
organization except pursuant
to a voluntary, written authorization by a member for the
payment of dues through payroll deduction. § 7218(c).

Conference adopts House
provision. § 7115(a).

NATIONAL CONSULTATION RIGHTS
Requires that the agency
"consider" the views or recommendations of the organization and that the agency
shall provide the labor organization a written statement of
the reasons for taking
whatever final action it finally
adopts. § 7113(b).

Requires that the view of
an organization be "carefully
considered." § 7213(b).

Adopts House provision
with the understanding that
the required written statement
of reasons need not be detailed. § 7113(b)(2).
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House Bill

Senate Bill

Compromise Bill

States that in the administration of all "matters covered
by the collective bargaining
agreement the officials and
employees shall be governed
by any future laws and regulations of appropriate authorities, including policies set
forth in the Federal Personnel
Manual, and any subsequently published agency policies and regulations required
by law or by the regulations
of appropriate authority."
The House amendment does
not contain this provision.
§ 7213(a)(1).

Authorizes, as in Senate
bill, the issuance of "government wide rules or regulations
which may restrict the scope
of collective bargaining which
might otherwise be permissible under the provisions of
this title. As in the House,
however, the Act generally
prohibits such governmentwide rule or regulation from
nullifying the effect of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. The exception to
this is the issuance of rules or
regulations implementing section 2302. Rules or regulations issued under section
2302 may have the effect of
requiring negotiation of a revision of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement to
the extent that the new rule or
regulation increases the protection of the rights of employees. See § 7116(a)(7).

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Makes it an unfair labor
practice for an agency "to prescribe any rule or regulation
which restricts the scope of
collective bargaining, or
which is in conflict with any
applicable collective bargaining agreement." § 7116(a)(7).

GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULES OR REGULATIONS
Gives any labor organization "'which is the exclusive
representative of a substantial
number of employees' national consultation ights with
respect to such rules or regulations whenever it affects
,any substantive change in
any condition of employThe procedures for
ment.'
consultation are similar to
those which govern national
consultation rights in other areas." § 7117(d).

No comparable provision.

Adopts House provision.
§ 7117(d)(l).

LABOR RELA TIONS REFORM
Senate Bill

House Bill

Compromise Bill

ILLEGAL STRIKES OR PICKETING
No comparable provision.

Provides that any labor organization which "'willfully
and intentionally' condones
any strike, work stoppage,
slowdown, or any picketing of
an agency that interferes with
an agency's operations shall,
upon an appropriate finding
by the Authority, have its exclusive recognition status revoked." § 7217(e).

Adopts Senate
with amendment.

language

"As agreed to by the conferees the provision will not
apply to instances where the
organization was involved in
The
picketing activities.
amendment also specifies that
the Authority may impose
disciplinary action other than
decertification. This is to allow for instances, such as a
wildcat strike, where decertification would not be appropriIn cases where the
ate.
Authority finds that a person
has violated this provision,
disciplinary action of some
kind must be taken. The Authority may take into account
the extent to which the organization made efforts to prevent or stop the illegal activity
in deciding whether the organization should be decertifled." § 7120(f(1)(2).

EXPRESSION OF PERSONAL VIEWS
No comparable provision.
House recedes to Senate
with amendment specifying in
greater detail the types of
statements that may be made
under this section. The provision authorizes statements encouraging employees to vote
in elections, to correct the record where false or misleading
statements are made, or to
convey the Government's
views on labor management
relations.

States that the expression of
"any personal views, argument, opinion, or the making
of any statement shall not
constitute an unfair labor
practice or invalidate an election if the expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit or undue
coercive conditions."
§ 7216(g).

"The wording of the conference report is intended to
reflect the current policy of
the Civil Service Commission
when advising agencies on
what statements they may
make during an election, and
to codify case law under execas
utive order 11,491,
amended, on the use of statements in any unfair labor
practice proceeding."
§ 7116(e).

Provides that, except for
certain specified exceptions,
an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement
"must follow the negotiated
grievance procedures rather
than the agency procedures
available to other employees
not covered by an agreement." § 7221(a).

House recedes. Conference
adopts Senate language.
§ 7121(a)(1).

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
Does not
ployee to the
cedures in the
of grievance.

limit the emnegotiated procase of any type
§ 7121(a).
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Senate Bill

Compromise Bill

require-

Establishes procedure the
arbitrator must "follow when
considering a grievance involving an adverse action
otherwise appealable to the
MSPB. In these instances the
arbitrator must follow the
same rules governing burden
of proof and standard of
proof that govern adverse actions before the Board."
§ 7221(h).

Adopts Senate provision in
order to promote consistency
in the resolution of these issues, and to avoid forum
shopping. § 7121(e). See CR,
supra note 3, at 157.

Does not authorize the parties to negotiate over the coverage and scope of the grievances that fall within the bill's
provisions but prescribes
those matters which would
have to be submitted, as a
matter of law, to the grievance
procedure. § 7121(a).

Provides that the scope and
coverage of the grievance procedures shall be negotiated by
the parties. § 7221(a).

Follows House with an
amendment: all matters that
under "the provisions of law
could be submitted to the
grievance procedures shall in
fact be within the scope of any
grievance procedure negotiated by the parties unless the
parties agree as part of the
collective bargaining process
that certain matters shall not
be covered by the grievance
procedures." § 7121(a).

"Authorizes any party to a
collective bargaining agreement to directly seek a District Court order requiring the
other party to proceed to arbitration rather than referring
the matter to the Authority."
The Senate has no comparable provision. § 7121(c).

No comparable provision.

House recedes.
All questions of this matter
will be considered at least in
the first instance by the Authority. § 7121(b)(c).

Authorizes OPM to intervene in Authority proceedings
and to request the Authority
to reopen and reconsider a decision by the Authority.
§ 7120(h)(3).

Deleted this provision but
stated that such deletion was
not intended in any way to reduce the ability of the OPM
or any other person to petition
for intervention before the
Authority or to petition for reconsideration by the Authority of its decisions.

House Bill
No comparable
ment.

ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS
No comparable provision.

LABOR RELATIONS REFORM
Senate Bill

Compromise Bill

No comparable provision.

Provides that negotiations
on procedures governing the
exercise of authority reserved
to management shall not "unreasonably delay the exercise
by management of its authority to act on such matters.
Any negotiations on procedures governing matters
otherwise reserved to agency
discretion by subsection (a)
may not have the effect of actually negating the authority
as reserved to the agency by
subsection (a)." § 7218(b).

Conference deletes this provision but wishes to emphasize that negotiations on such
procedures should "not be
conducted in a way that prevents the agency from acting
at all, or in a way that prevents the exclusive representative from negotiating fully on
Similarly, the
procedures.
parties may not indirectly do
what the section prohibits
them from doing directly."

States that after voluntary
arrangements prove unsuccessful, the parties may agree
to a procedure for binding arbitration, rather than to require the services of the Federal Service Impasses Panel,
"but only if the procedure is
approved by the panel."
§ 7119(b).

States that arbitration or
third party fact finding with
recommendations to assist in
the resolution of an impasse
may be used by the parties
only when "authorized or directed by the panel."
§ 7222(d).

Senate recedes. § 7119(b).

Provides that if no exception to an arbitrator's award is
filed within the specified time,
the award is "final and binding." § 7122(b). Intent of
House in adopting this provision was to make it clear that
the awards of arbitrators,
when they become final, are
not subject to further review
by any other authority or adminstrative body, including
the Comptroller General.
CR, supra note 3, at 158.

No comparable provision.

House Bill

Other authority or administrative body, including the
CR,
Comptroller General.
supra note 3, at 158.

Adopts House language.

§ 7122(b).
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House Bill

Senate Bill

Authorizes negotiations except to the extent inconsistent
with laws, rules and regula§§ 7103(a)(12)(14),
tions.
7117(a)(1)(2)(3).

Authorizes negotiations except to the extent inconsistent
with laws, rules and regulations. §§ 7215(c), 7218(a).

No comparable wording.

Specifically states that this
includes policies set forth in
the Federal Personnel Manual. § 7218(a)(l)(A).

Compromise Bill
Follows House approach
where there are similar differences due to the Senate reference to policies as well as
rules and regulations. Conferees specifically intend,
however, that the term "rule
or regulations" be interpreted
as including official declarations of policy of an agency
which are binding on officials
and agencies to which they
apply. The right of labor organizations to enjoy national
consultation rights also include such official declarations of policy which are
binding on officials or agencies.

CERTAIN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Provides certain savings
clauses for employees principally in agencies under the
Department of the Interior
and the Department of Energy who have traditionally
negotiated contracts in accordance with prevailing rates
in the private sector of the
economy and who were subject to the savings clauses prescribed in Section 9(b) of Pub.
L. No. 92-392 enacted Aug.
19, 1972. § 704(d). CR, supra
note 3, at 159.

No comparable provision.

Adopts House provison
with amendment: "As revised,
section 704(d) overrules the
decision of the Comptroller
General in cases numbered BL89782 (Feb. 3, 1978) and BL9L520 (June 6, 1978), relating to certain negotiated contracts applicable to employees
under the Department of the
Interior and the Department
of Energy. This section also
provides specific statutory authorization for the negotiation
of wages, terms and conditions of employment and
other employment benefits
traditionally negotiated by
these employees in accordance with prevailing practices
in the private sector of the
economy."

LABOR RELATIONS REFORM
House Bill
No comparable provision.

Senate Bill
No comparable provision.

Compromise Bill
"Section 704(d)(1) authorizes and requires the agencies
to negotiate on any terms and
conditions of employment
which were the subject of negotiations prior to August 19,
1972, the date of enactment of
Public Law 92-392. Section
704(d)(1) may not be construed to nullify, curtail or
otherwise impair the right or
duty of any party to negotiate
for the renewal, extension,
modification, or improvements of benefits negotiated."
"Section 704(d)(2) requires
the negotiation of pay and
pay practices in accordance
with prevailing pay and pay
practices without regard to
chapter 71 (as amended by
this conference report), subchapter IV of chapter 53, or
subchapter V of chapter 55, of
title 5, United States Code, in
accordance with prevailing
practices in the industry."
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APPENDIX 3
COMPARISON OF SELECTED PRO VISIONS OF
EXEC ORDER NO. 11,491, TITLE VII OF THE CSRA,
AND THE NLRA
3

Tile VII, CSRA 2

NLRA

Collective bargaining safeguards public interest, contributes to effective business,
and facilitates settlement of
disputes. § 7101(a). The Act
is to be interpreted "in a
manner consistent with the
requirement of an effective
and efficient Government."
§ 7101(b).

It is the policy of the U.S. to
eliminate obstructions to the
free flow of commerce by
encouraging collective bargaining and protecting selforganization of workers for
negotiating terms and conditions of their employment.
§1.

1. Employees have the right
to form, join, and assist
any unions, or refrain,
without the fear of reprisal. This right includes
collective bargaining.
§ 7101(b).

1. Employees have the right
to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to
bargain collectively, and
to engage in concerted
activities, or to refrain
therefrom; however, such
rights may be affected by
a union security agreement. § 7. The right to
strike is both recognized
and regulated. § 8(b).

I. It is an agency ULP to:

I. It is an employer ULP to:

Exec. Order No. 11,491, as
amendedl
PURPOSE
Efficiency of Government is
improved by employee participation in the formulation
of personnel policies. Preamble.

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
I. Employees have the right
to form, join, and assist
any unions, or refrain
therefrom, without the
fear of reprisal. § l(a).

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
1. Management shall not:
(a) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employee rights.
§ 19(a)(1).

(a) same or comparable
provision.
§ 7116(a)(I).

(a) same or comparable
provision. § 8(a)(l).

(b) discriminate in condi-

(b) same or comparable

(b) same or comparable

1. Oct. 29, 1969, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,616, Aug. 26, 1971,
36 Fed. Reg. No. 17,819; Exec. Order No. 11,636, Dec. 17, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,901; Exec. Order
No. 11,838, Feb. 6, 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 5743, 7391; Exec. Order No. 11,901, Jan. 30, 1976, 41 Fed.
Reg. 4807; Exec. Order No. 12,027, Dec. 5, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,581. This analysis does not
include Exec. Order No. 12,107, Dec. 28, 1978, 44 Fed. Reg. 1055, because this last executive
order, as part of President Carter's reorganization plan, anticipates and incorporates many of the
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act.
2. Civil Services Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1977).
3. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1977), [references are to sections of
the Act]. When appropriate, references are made to Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-167, 171-197 [abbreviated as LMRA] and to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1977) [abbreviated as LMRDA].
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to encourage or discourage union membership. § 19(a)(2).
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provision.
§ 7116(a)(2).
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provision, except that
union security agreements are allowed,
subject to § 14(b).
§ 8(a)(3).

(c) control or assist a
union, except for routine provision of service on an impartial
basis. § 19(a)(3).

(c) same or comparable
provision.
§ 7116(a)(3).

(c) comparable provision.
§ 8(a)(2).

(d) retaliate for complaint
or testimony.
§ 19(a)(4).

(d) same or comparable
provision.
§ 7116(a)(4).

(d) comparable provision.
§ 8(a)(4).

(e) refuse to accord appropriate recognition
to a qualified union.
§ 19(a)(5).

(e) comparable provision,
but not specifically set
forth as a ULP.
§§ 7116(a)(8), 7111,
7113.

(e) comparable provision,
but exclusive representation only. §§ 9(a),
8(a)(5).

(f) refuse to consult with
a labor organization
holding national consultation rights.
,§ 19(a)(6), 19(a)(9).

(0 same or comparable

(f) exclusive
representation only.
§§ 9(a), 8(a)(5).

(g) refuse to negotiate
with a labor organization accorded exclusive recognition.

(g) same or comparable
provision.
§§ 7116(a)(5), 7111.

(g) comparable provision.
§ 8(a)(5).

(h) no comparable provision.

(h) to fail to cooperate in
impasse resolution.
§ 7116(a)(6).

(h) no comparable provision. Strike alternative available to private sector.

(i) employers are governed by existing and
future laws and regulations. § 12(a).

(i) to enforce a regulation conflicting with a
preexisting collective
bargaining agreement.
§ 7116(a)(7).

(i) no comparable provision because of the
private nature of the
employer.

(j) no comparable provision.

(I) "otherwise fail or re-

(I) no comparable provi-

2. A labor organization shall
not:

provision.
§§ 7116(a)(5), 7113.

fuse to comply with
any provision" of title
VII. § 7116(a)(8).
2. It is an ULP for a labor
organization to:

sion.

2. It is a ULP for a labor
organization to:

(a) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employee rights.

(a) same or comparable
provision.
§ 7116(b)(1).

(a) restrain or coerce employees in their exercise of § 7 rights, with
a proviso for union
security. § 8(b)(1).

(b) attempt to induce
management to coerce

(b) same or comparable
provision.

(b) cause an employer to
discriminate on the
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basis of union activity
or for nonmembership
in a labor organization (except for failure
to pay fees). § 8(b)(2).

(c) retaliate against an
employee by interfering with work.
§ 19(b)(3).

(c) same or comparable
provision.
§ 7116(b)(3).

(c) no comparable provision.

(d) call, engage in, or
condone a strike,
slowdown, or picketing. § 19(b)(4). However, first amendment
right to peacefully
picket recognized in
National Treasury
Employee Union v.
Fasser, 428 F. Supp.
295 (D.D.C. 1976).

(d) call, participate, or
condone a strike,
slow-down, or picketing "if such picketing
interferes with an
agency's operation."
§ 7116(b)(7).
Non-interfering
informational
picketing allowed.
§ 7116(b).

(d) engage in organizational picketing in certain contexts, as well
as recognitional strikes
against a certified
union. Also forbids
secondary boycotts
and hot cargo provisions. §§ 8(b)(4), (7),
and (e).

(e) engage in race, sex,
age or national origin
discrimination.
§ 19(b)(5).

(e) comparable provision,
but adds "preferential
or non-preferential
civil service status, political affiliation, marital status, or handicapping condition."
§ 7116(b)(4).

(e) no comparable provision. However, judicially imposed. See
Rubber Workers, Local 12 v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12
(5th Cir. 1966).

(f) refuse to consult, confer or negotiate with
an agency. § 19(b)(6).

(f) comparable provision.
§ 7116(b)(5).

(f) refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, when the
union is the bargaining representative.
§ 8(b)(3).

(g) no comparable provision.

(g) fail to cooperate in
impasse resolution.
§ 7116(b)(6).

(g) no comparable provision. Strike available
to private sector.

(h) no comparable provision.

(h) to otherwise fail to
comply with title VII.
§ 7116(b)(8).

(h) no comparable provision.

(i) same or comparable
provision. § 19(c).

(i) to deny membership
except for failure to
meet occupational
standard or to tender
dues. § 7116(c).

(i) no comparable provision, although excessive or discriminatory
fees are prohibited.
§ 8(b)(5).

3. No comparable provision.

3. Free speech proviso:
non-threatening
expression of opinion (I)
publicizing a representa-

3. Free speech proviso:
non-threatening
expression of opinion
"shall not constitute nor
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NLRA
be evidence of an unfair
labor practice." § 8(c).

constitute an ULP. . . or
(B) . . . grounds for the

setting aside of any election..
" § 7116(e).
ADMINISTRATI ON

1. Federal Labor Relations
Council (FLRC): consists
of (part-time) the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, Secretary of
Labor, Director of the
Office of Management
and Budget, and any
other official appointed
by the President, to administer and interpret the
order, decide policy issues, hear appeals to arbitration awards, negotiability issues, and other
matters it deems appropriate. § 4.

(a) No comparable provision.

1. Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA): 3
full-time members, bipartisan, appointed by the
President with Senate advice and consent, to be
removed only for cause,
serving 5 year staggered
terms; to administer the
law, determine appropriate units, supervise elections, decide ULP cases,
prevent ULP's, determine
national consultation
rights, determine "compelling need," determine
official time for union
representation, and resolve exceptions to arbitrator's awards.
§§ 7104(a)-(e), 7105(a),
713 1(c).

1. National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB): appointed by the President
with Senate consent, for
staggered 5 year terms, to
be removed only for
cause, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance; to determine
appropriate units and
otherwise supervise elections, decide ULP cases,
prevent ULP's, and administer the Act. §§ 3(a),
(b), 9, 10.

(a) General Counsel,
within the FLRA, appointed by the President with Senate consent, serves for a 5
year term, at the pleasure of the President;
investigates and prosecutes unfair labor
practice complaints.
§ 7104(0.

(a) General Counsel appointed by the President, with Senate consent for a 4 year term,
investigates and prosecutes ULP's. § 3(d).

RECOGNITION
I. Exclusive recognition
granted to labor organization winning majority
vote in secret ballot election. No election is required where units are
combining/consolidating.

§ 10.

1. Exclusive recognition
granted by a secret ballot
election with a majority
of employees. § 7111.

1. Representatives are "selected" by the majority of
employees in the unit.
Selection may be by secret ballot election or by
informal recognition by
employer of a union demonstrating majority support. § 9(a).
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2. National consultation
rights accorded when the
organization represents a
substantial number of
employees, under criteria
developed by the FLRC.
§ 9(a).

2.

Comparable provision,
but criteria developed by
FLRA, § 7113.

2. No comparable provision;
exclusive representation
only is allowed in the
private sector. § 9(a).

3.

3. Same or comparable provision. § 7114(a)(5).

3. No comparable provision
although individuals may
present their own grievance without the intervention of the union, provided the union has been
given the opportunity to
be present. § 9(a).

4. A unit may be established
which will ensure an
identifiable community of
interest and promote effective dealings and operations. § 10(b).

4. The FLRA determines
appropriateness of a unit
to ensure fullest employee
freedom in exercising
rights, identifiable community of interest, and
promote effective dealings
and operations. § 7112.

4. The NLRB determines
appropriateness of unit to
ensure fullest freedom of
the rights guaranteed by
the Act. § 9(b). "Community of interest" is an
important criterion. See
Gorman at 69.

5. A unit excludes management officials, supervisors
and employees performing non-clerical Federal
personnel work.
§§ 10(b)(I)-(4).

5. A unit excludes confidential employees, management officials, supervisors,
employees performing
non-clerical personnel
work, and employees in
security, audit work, or
employees administering
a law related to labor
relations. § 7112(b).

5. The term "employee" excludes agricultural laborers, domestics, independent contractors, supervisors, public employees,
and those subject to the
Railway Labor Act.
§§ 2(3), (2). Management
and confidential employees excluded by common
law of the Board. See
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).

Exclusive recognition
does not preclude employees from choosing
their own representative
in a grievance or appeal
action, except when a
grievance is covered by a
negotiated grievance procedure. § 7(d)(1).

REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND DUTIES
1. When accorded exclusive
recognition, an organization must represent all
employees without regard
to union membership.
§ 10(e).

I. Same or comparable provision. § 7114(a)(1).

1. Such a duty construed by
the courts as correlative
to right of exclusive representation. See Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967). However, duty
extends to all in unit not
only regardless of union
membership, but regardless of race or sex or any
other reason.

2. No comparable provision.

2. Union right to be present
at investigatory interview
if the employee reasonably believes the exami-

2. Such a right contained in
§ 7, according to NLRB
v. Weingarten, 416 U.S.
969 (1975). However, the
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The agency must inform
employees of this right
annually. § 7114(3).
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private sector right accrues to the individual,
not to the union; moreover, there is no duty to
annually so inform employees.

DUTY TO BARGAIN
1. An agency and exclusive
union must meet at reasonable times and confer
in good faith on personnel policies, practices, and
working conditions, "so
far as . . . appropriate
under applicable laws
and regulations." § 11.

1. An agency and exclusive
union shall meet and negotiate in good faith for
the purpose of arriving at
a collective bargaining
agreement. § 7114(a)(4).

1. Employer and bargaining
representative must "meet
at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment."
§§ 8(a)(5), (b)(3), and (d).

2. The obligation to meet
and confer does not include certain topics: mission; budget; organization; number of employees; number, types, and
grades of position; tour of
duty; technology; security;
or higher level regulations
where there has been
demonstrated a compelling need to maintain
such agency policies and
regulations. §§ 1 (a), (b),
12(b).

2. Management retains the
right to determine the
mission, budget, organization, number of employees, security practices; to
hire, assign, lay off, retain, suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay,
discipline, assign work,
fill positions, and take
any action "necessary to
carry out the agency mission during emergencies."
Negotiations are not required on higher level
regulations where there
has been demonstrated a
compelling need to maintain them. An agency
may, at its option, negotiate number, types, and
grades of employees;
work projects; tour of
duty; or technology or
manner of performing
work. § 7106. There is
no duty to reach agreement. § 7103(a)(12).

2. No comparable provision.
Management rights are
generally left to the bargaining process. There is
no duty to reach an
agreement. § 8(d).

3. Each agreement is governed by existing or future laws and regulations.
§ 12(a).

3. Agreement shall not be
inconsistent with Federal
law or Government-wide
rules or regulations for
which there is a compelling need. § 7117.

3. No comparable provision
because of the private nature of the employer.

4. No agreement could require union membership
or involuntary dues.
§ 12(c).

4. Employee rights include
the right to refrain from
joining a union. § 7102.

4. An agreement could
make membership a condition of employment,
subject to state right to
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work laws. §§ 7, 8(b)(l),
14(b).

GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRA4TION
I. An agreement must contain an exclusive grievance procedure, scope
and coverage of which
are to be negotiated, but
not include matters for
which statutory appeal
procedures exist. It may
provide for arbitration,
which can be requested
only by the agency or
union. §§ 13(a), (b).

1. An agreement must contain an exclusive negotiated grievance procedure,
scope and coverage of
which are to be negotiated; it can include statutory appeals matters. It
must not include grievances over political activity, insurance, retirement,
national security suspension, appointment process, or classification of
grade. The grievance
procedure must provide
for binding arbitration
which may be invoked by
management or the
union. Employees retain
the right to choose either
the negotiated grievance
procedure or an applicable statutory appeals procedure, but not both.

§ 7121.
2. Arbitrator's awards appealable to the FLRC
"under regulations prescribed by the Council."
§ 13(a). Under the regulations, awards were to be
sustained "on grounds
similar to those applied
by the courts in [the] private sector. . .. .

1. No comparable provision.
"Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by
the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable
method of settlement of
grievance disputes arising
over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement .. "
§ 203(d), LMRA. Contractual clauses establishing a grievance and arbitration procedure are
ubiquitous, as a matter of
voluntary agreement.
Management agrees to
such clauses as the quid
pro quo for the union's
agreement not to strike
for the duration of the
contract. See Local 174,
Internat'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962).

2. Arbitrator's awards appealable to the FLRA on
the ground that it is contrary to law, rule, or regulation, or "on other
grounds similar to those
applied by Federal courts
in [the] private sector .. " § 7122(a).

2. No comparable provision.
Arbitration awards judicially reviewed on very
narrow grounds only. Judicial deference to an
award "so long as it
draws its essence from the
collective bargaining
agreement." United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960).

1. Same or comparable provision. § 7119(a).

1. Any party seeking to terminate or modify a contract must give notice to
FMCS; any employee
striking within the notice
period loses employee status. FMCS notified and
involved in national
emergency disputes.
Health care employees
must give notice before
any strike or picketing,
and FMCS required to

5

C.F.R. 2411. 18(d).
DISPUTES AND IMPASSE
I. The Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) provides assistance in mediating negotiation disputes. § 17.
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act in health care disputes. §§ 8(d), (g);
§§ 206-210, 213, LMRA.

2. Upon failure of FMCS
resolution, the Federal
Service Impasses Panel
(FSIP), at the request of
either party, may settle
negotiation impasses by
action it deems appropriate. §§ 5(b), 17.

2. Same or comparable provision. § 7119(b).

2. No comparable provision.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS" INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. Internal democracy, fiscal
integrity and disclosure,
and freedom from corrupt
influence. §§ 7(b), 18(a),
(c).

1. Comparable provision.
§§ 7111(0, 7120(a), (b),
(c).

1. Comparable provisions in
LMRDA.

2.

2. Comparable provision.
§§ 7103(a)(4)(B),
7120(a)(2).

2. No comparable provision.

3. Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management Relations to prescribe regulations conforming generally to
those in the private sector. § 7120(d).

3. No comparable provision.

1. Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA): 3
full-time members, bipartisan, appointed by the
President with Senate advice and consent, to be
removed only for cause,
serving 5 year staggered
terms; to administer the
law, determine appropriate units, supervise elections, decide ULP cases,
prevent ULP's, determine
national consultation
rights, determine "compelling need," determine
official time for union
representation, and resolve exceptions to arbitrator's awards.
§§ 7104(a)-(e), 7105(a),
713 1(c).

1. National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB): appointed by the President
with Senate consent, for
staggered 5 year terms, to
be removed only for
cause, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance; to determine
appropriate units and
otherwise supervise elections, decide ULP cases,
prevent ULP's, and administer the Act. §§ 3(a),
(b), 9, 10.

Freedom from communist
control and advocacy of
overthrow of U.S. government. §§ 2(e)(3), 18(a).

3. No comparable provision.

ADMINISTRATION
1. Federal Labor Relations
Council (FLRC): consists
of (part-time) the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, Secretary of
Labor, Director of the
Office of Management
and Budget, and any
other official appointed
by the President, to administer and interpret the
order, decide policy issues, hear appeals to arbitration awards, negotiability issues, and other
matters it deems appropriate. § 4.
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(a) No comparable provision.

(a) General Counsel,
within the FLRA, appointed by the President with Senate consent, serves for a 5
year term, at the pleasure of the President;
investigates and prosecutes unfair labor
practice complaints.
§ 7104(0.

(a) General Counsel appointed by the President, with Senate consent for a 4 year term,
investigates and prosecutes ULP's. § 3(d).

(b) Federal Service Impasse Panel (FSIP): 3
members appointed by
the President, to take
action to settle impasses. § 5.

(b) Federal Service Impasse Panel: Enlarged
to 6 members, appointed by the President for 5 year terms,
takes action in negotiating impasses.

(b) No comparable provision because of the
right to strike in the
private sector. §§ 7,
13.

2. See FLRA supra.

2. See NLRB supra.

1. No comparable provision.
Complaints decided by
the Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Labor-Management Relations, § 6(a)(4).
29 C.F.R. 20315 (1979).

1. Complaints prosecuted by
General Counsel.
§ 7118(a).

I. Comparable provision.
§ 3(d).

2. No comparable provision.

2. Six month statute of limitations for filing charge
with FLRA.
§ 7118(a)(4)(A).
Contains discovery exception and exception for
negligence of agent.
§ 7118(a)(4)(B).

2. Comparable provision,
but sole exception relates
to military service.
§ 10(b).

No comparable provision.

3. General Counsel investigates the charge and may
issue a complaint.
§ 7118(a)(1).

3. Same or comparable provision § 10(b).

2. Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations: to determine appropriate units,
supervise representation
elections, determine national consultation rights,
decide unfair labor practice complaints, and decide whether a grievance
is subject to a negotiated
grievance procedure or
arbitration. § 6.
PROCEDURES

3.
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4. If the General Counsel
does not issue a complaint "because the
charge fails to state an
ULP," the GC must provide the claimant with a
reason for not issuing the
complaint. § 7118(a)(1).

4. If the complaint is to be
dismissed, the Board shall
state its findings of fact.

5. No comparable provision.

5. Charges may be resolved
informally before the issuance of a complaint.
§ 7118(a)(5).

5. Comparable provision.
§ 10(k).

6. No comparable provision.

6. Hearings not conducted
according to the rules of
evidence. § 7118(a)(6).

6. Hearings conducted according to the rules of
evidence. § 10(b).

7. No comparable provision.

7. Transcript to be kept of
the hearing. § 711 8(a)(6).

7. Comparable provision.
§ 10(c).

8. No comparable provision.

8. FLRA or designated
member shall decide case
on a preponderance of
the evidence.
§ 7118(a)(7).

8. Comparable provision.

9. No comparable provision.

9. When hearing examiner
finds that no ULP has
been committed, such
findings of fact shall be
written and the complaint
dismissed. § 7118(c)(8).

9. Comparable provision.
§ 10(c).
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4. No comparable provision.

§ 10(c).

§ 10(c).

OFFICIAL TIME" CHECK-OFF
I. Agency and union may
agree that employee representatives may negotiate
on official time up to 40
hours or one-half of actual time in negotiation.
The number of employee
representatives covered
shall not exceed the
number of management
representatives. Internal
union affairs are off company time. § 20.

1. Employees representing
exclusive representatives
are to be granted official
time for negotiations, including impasse, in the
same numbers as are representing management.
But internal union affairs
are to be managed off
company time. § 7131.

1. No comparable provision;
left to the bargaining
process.

2. Exclusive union; agency
and union may negotiate
dues withholding upon
employee's authorization,
which can be revoked at
6 mo. intervals. § 21.

2. Exclusive union: agency
must deduct union dues
at no cost to union if so
authorized in writing by
an employee; authorizations can be revoked only
at I year intervals.
§ 7115(a).

2. No comparable provision;
left to the bargaining
process.
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3. No comparable provision.

3. Where there is no exclusive union, but one with
10% employee membership; if the FLRA certifies the petition, the
agency must negotiate
with the union solely concerning the deduction of
dues. § 7115(c).

3. No comparable provision.

1. Where appropriate in
ULP cases, FLRA shall

1. Where appropriate in
ULP cases, the NLRB
shall issue a (a) cease and
desist order, and (b) shall
"take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with
or without back pay as
will effectuate the policies
of this Act." Back pay
may be required of either
the employer or the
union. § 10(c).

REMEDIES
1. Where appropriate in a
ULP case, the Assistant
Secretary of Labor-Management Relations may
require the violator (a) to
cease and desist, or (b)
"to take such affirmative
action as he considers appropriate to effectuate the
policies of the order."
§ 6(b).

a. cease and desist order.
§ 7118(a)(7)(A).
b. order to renegotiate a
contract with the new
contract given retroactive effect.
§ 7118(a)(7)(B).
c. order of reinstatement
with back pay, to be
paid by perpetrator of
ULP, whether the
agency or the union.
§§ 7118(a)(7),
7118(a)(7)(C).
d. any other order "as
will carry out the purpose of this chapter."
§§ 7118(a)(7)(D),
7015(g)(3).

2. No comparable provision.

2. Upon issuance of complaint, FLRA may petition an appropriate court
for temporary relief to
prevent ULP. The court
shall not grant such relief
"if it would interfere with
the ability of the agency
to carry out its essential
functions or if the Authority fails to establish
probable cause that an
ULP is being committed."
§ 7123(d).

2. Upon issuance of a complaint, the NLRB may
petition an appropriate
district court for temporary relief. § 10(j).

3. No comparable provision.

3.

No comparable provision.

3. Suits for breach of contracts may be brought in
district courts. § 301,
LMRA.
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JUDICIAL REVIEWAND ENFORCEMENT
1. No comparable provision.

1. Final orders of the FLRA
are reviewable in the
courts of appeals.
§ 7123(a).
a. party entitled to
review:
(1) any person
aggrieved
by a final order.
§ 7123(a).
(2)

the FLRA when
seeking
enforcement of its
order.
§ 7123(b).

1. Comparable provisions.
§§ 10(e), (f). Arbitration
awards are reviewable in
district courts only on
very narrow grounds.
Board decisions in election cases are not reviewable directly because they
are not final orders. AFL
v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401
(1970).

b. however, arbitration
awards and unit determinations are not reviewable.
§§ 7123(a)(1), (2).
c. venue: circuit in
which the person aggrieved by the order
resides or transacts
business, or in the
District of Columbia.
§ 7123(a)(2).
2. No comparable provision.

3.

No comparable provision.

2. "The findings of the Authority with respect to
questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall
be conclusive." § 7123(c).

2. Comparable provision.

3.

3. Comparable provision.
§§ 10(0, (h).

Court of Appeals may
grant any temporary relief "it considers just and
proper." § 7123(c).

§§ 10(e), (f).

4. No comparable provision.

4. Court of Appeals may affirm, modify, or set aside
the order of the FLRA.
§ 7123(c).

4. Comparable provision.
§ 10(0.

5. No comparable provision.

5. Order of Court of Appeals reviewable in
Supreme Court upon certiorari or certification.
§ 7123(c).

5. Same provision. § 10(e).

